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By Mercedes Cardona 
Steven Adamske was Communications Director for the House Financial Services Committee 
under Chairman Barney Frank in 2008 and later served as a spokesman for the Treasury 
Department under Secretary Timothy Geithner. Adamske handled communications for issues 
including the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the auto industry rescue, and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. At Treasury, he specialized in 
domestic finance issues such as the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the wind-down of 
TARP, and implementation of Dodd-Frank. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an 
interview with Mr. Adamske. 
Don’t hide, and lead by example.  
No matter how scary the possibilities, it doesn’t pay to sugarcoat a situation, said Adamske. 
In the midst of a crisis, getting buy-in from the public may not be the top priority, but any 
measures policymakers will take need to be made clear and relatable to the public. He 
explained further: 
You can’t downplay anything. Oftentimes when there’s a crisis, you get one shot to 
say, “Hey, this is the way it’s going to be and [how you should] prepare yourself.” 
When the President is saying it and other people are saying it, etc., be open, be 
honest, and have a plan for, not just how you’re going to communicate it, but what 
you’re going to do. 
Adamske contrasted the government’s efforts during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 
with the response to the COVID–19 pandemic and the debate over wearing masks and 
implementing other preventive measures. In Adamske’s view, the government failed to 
both make a case for those measures and model them for the public in the small window of 
opportunity available in early March 2020. He hoped for more from the Biden 
administration: 
So, the incoming administration, I hope they do a couple things. One: effectively tell 
people where we are and what we have to do to get out of it. And [two]: get the 
vaccine rolled out: Who gets it, where is it going, how many doses are there, 
everybody above the age of 80 by a certain time. Effectively start to lay these things 
out and these milestones and hold themselves accountable for it. Those are difficult 
things to do. 
Make Wall Street relatable to Main Street. 
Adamske shared that it was important to communicate in a way that was understandable 
to a broad cross-section of the public.   “…As my boss [Representative] Barney Frank used 




meaning that connections between events are not easily spotted, related Adamske. What 
may seem to be widely disparate events, he continued, can be closely related. He explained 
that during the GFC, “you had things that happened in those financial institutions [like Wall 
Street, and London, Frankfurt, and Singapore] that affected people on Main Street and 
places like Las Vegas and Stockton, California, and Phoenix, and places where there were 
lots of foreclosures and credit card defaults. Communications need to make the case to the 
public in ways the public can relate to, said Adamaske. It’s no coincidence that news stories 
about the economy often start with an anecdote about an ordinary citizen. Adamske 
advised, “Talk it through. Tell people. Make it relatable to voters and to middle-class 
people, working-class people out there. There’s a lot that people will do. There’s a lot that 
people will understand.” 
By comparison to much of the government’s assistance to the financial sector that had 
come before it, the House bill to rescue the auto industry was much easier to explain, said 
Adamske:  
That was a much more direct piece of communication because it was American jobs. 
The bailout of the finance services world was a more diffused message about, “We 
need to do this in order to reduce foreclosures, in order to not have as many job 
losses.” [Assistance to the auto industry] was a more direct set of messaging that, 
“We’re here to protect American jobs and give these companies a chance to compete 
on a worldwide stage with China, with Europe and Japan, etc.” 
Adamske acknowledged that communicating complex economic concepts can be 
challenging, because dealing with the crisis will consume resources. At the height of the 
GFC, said Adamske, he had a staff of two and was working “full throttle” more than 16 
hours per day. He said he didn’t see his two year old for the whole month of September 
2008.  
Preparing materials ahead of the crisis and educating news media and legislators about 
instruments such as credit swaps and derivatives can be a challenge when they are not in 
the news, said Adamske. “Their eyes will glaze over,” he said. But having printed materials 
can be useful once the crisis breaks:  
The caucus meetings happened almost every night in the Hill at that time. We 
developed a glossary: “What is a residential mortgage-backed security? What is a 
commercial mortgage-backed security? What is a derivative? How do those things 
work?” That kind of thing. I should have passed it out to the press too because 
there’s a whole lot of press people who didn’t have any idea what they were doing. 
Tamp down quickly on rumors. 
A sea change from the 2008 crisis to today is the ubiquity of digital media and the way they 
can amplify unsubstantiated rumors, said Adamske. The “whack-a-mole” effort against 
rumors is a big part of the effort of communicating today, he added. He noted that there 
will always be segments of society that will believe there are aliens in Area 51, and in the 
wake of the COVID–19 pandemic, there are still anti-vaxxers, conspiracy theorists, and 
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others. But, after witnessing the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, it may be 
time to consider some regulation of social media, Adamske suggested. However, he 
admitted that such a thing would be hard to do. But with most of the country getting their 
information on Facebook and Twitter, “there’s just too much misinformation.” 
Adamske was clear that the current situation presents challenges that didn’t exist during 
the GFC:  
We’re in a situation now where even if you do all the things right—you’re relatable, 
you’re doing the right things, you’re getting the information out, you have a good 
action plan, you’re communicating it often, you’re telling people what to do, you’re 
leading by example—there’s going to be a certain segment who are on these 
platforms that are spreading disinformation.  
Have lines of communication with other agencies. 
Adamske recalled that the staffs of the Treasury Department and House Financial Services 
Committee communicated often, as did Rep. Frank with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. But, 
he said, it would have been useful to have more communication with the Bush White House 
staff. Once Treasury proposed the TARP program, it began to coordinate communications 
with other agencies.  
Adamske noted that after the Fed decided not to rescue Lehman Brothers from collapse 
and stepped in for insurance giant AIG, Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson 
held a meeting with congressional leadership after the market closed laying the 
foundations for the TARP bill and brought the four or five press secretaries into the 
meeting to work out a coordinated announcement. He remembers that, 
We were just doing a lot of it on the fly when that situation happened, but once that 
calmed down a little bit and we were able to focus on the TARP legislation, our 
communications became very direct. It became very clear what we needed to do. We 
had provided paper and communications to our members as to what we were doing 
and why we were doing it, and then we were also on CNBC a lot. 
After the crisis, the various policy organizations have continued to work together. Some 
structures emerged from post-crisis legislation, recalled Adamske: 
We did establish the Financial Services Oversight Council, which is the collection of 
regulators called for in the [Dodd-Frank] Act, which breaks down barriers, so when 
there’s a crisis, they can meet, and they can across agencies to figure out better what 
to do. We did stand that up, and that’s been a success. 
For maximum effectiveness, policymakers should keep the momentum going after 
the initial actions to address shocks are taken; there may not be a second chance to 
take related steps. 
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While communications were largely effective during the GFC, Adamske opined, once the 
Obama administration passed the initial measures of the auto industry rescue, its members 
shifted their attention to other priorities, such as the effort to overhaul healthcare, which 
he sees as not ideal. The effort to pass the Dodd-Frank Act and reform the financial system 
got “outranked,” said Adamske. The act passed on the strength of House members 
understanding what was at stake, but without “air cover” from the Treasury Department to 
help them make the case back in their home districts. He notes: 
I love Barack Obama, but I wish the Obama administration, once Dodd-Frank was 
passed, would have continued the communications push on the implementation, 
talking about it more. They just moved on, and that was an unfortunate missed 
opportunity. I would have done that all over again. 
A similar dynamic played out during the debate over the COVID–19 stimulus bills, noted 
Adamske. Congress found a figure of $1.5 trillion too daunting, and settled for a smaller 
amount, hoping to come back later for more. Instead, Adamske noted, there wasn’t much 
appetite from the Congress or the Trump administration to fight for a second bite at the 
apple.  
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